Ban Peter Carruthers' work from the classroom!!!

Do you really question whether or not animals can feel? Do you think that it is moral to care about them? Peter Carruthers does not.

    My name is Melissa Lalonde and I am registered in a first year Philosophy course at University. In our text there is an article that is against animal rights that I believe should be removed from the text for following years. The article Brute Experience written by Peter Carruthers is morally objectionable and extremely bothersome to me. When we recently learned about this piece I was extremely shocked and distraught. My professor was very professional in the way that he taught the views in this piece, however when I read it myself I was extremely disturbed and hurt by it. I am concerned that people will act on views that are printed in this text. It is people who act on this that are disturbing, however even allowing something like this to be published is wrong.
    People like me spend our time and energy fighting against people like him, and allowing his work to be read in an upstanding University like the University of Toronto is wrong. It is as if the University is advocating these views (even though they obviously would not). There is no reason why anyone should have to even consider that the pains of animals do not exist, when it is obvious that they do. Teaching young minds that it is appropriate to not be bothered by animals in pain is wrong. When we read a piece like this one that explicitly states that animals do not deserve our sympathy and that even if they break their legs and are in pain, their lives should have no rational claims on us people start to change their views. This is extremely painful for those of us who are working to make people realize that animals are deserving of much more than our sympathy.
    Carruthers even goes so far as to say that we are wasting our time and money on issues like this because, and I quote, "...such activities are not only morally unsupportable but morally objectionable." (Carruthers 354) Apparently us caring for animals is getting in the way of our serious moral objectives and that we should not concern ourselves with their injuries. This is disgusting to me. I was literally brought to tears when I read this piece because it is so hard for me to imagine that people like him exist, let alone that they are published.
    I believe that if people are told that animals cannot feel and that they are not worth our time and energy to help that people will start to be even more trouble for them. If young minds are taught that animals cannot feel a broken leg than they might think it is acceptable to hit and kick them.
    I would really appreciate getting this piece removed from the curriculum for next years class. It is not necessary to expose people to information like this because in itself what he has written is morally wrong. These are simply his views, however it is wrong to advocate them because they are so disheartening. I do not agree with allowing students to read this piece because there is no telling what people will do when they start to believe that animals feel no pain and that its perfectly fine to not care about their pain. I am strongly opposed to this piece of "work", and I am certain that I am not alone in this.
    I wish to have a stronger case against publishing this piece in further texts of Reason and Responsibility. I do not want to cause any trouble, I am just so dead set against this piece being read. I have researched Peter Carruthers since I read this article and this piece is not the only one that is against animal rights. I obviously cannot stop him from having his views (despite how much I wish I could), however I can try to stop this piece from being read by students as part of their Philosophy course. I did not register in this course to be hurt by a piece like this. Even his calling animals brutes is terrible on its own. If you agree with my stance on this issue please do what you can to help me.
    I have enclosed a link to Brute Experience that I found on the internet so that you can read the article if you have not already done so. Below are the exact points in the piece that bothered me the most so that you can focus your attention on them.


Brute Experience: http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/

• The question whether brutes have experiences has been granted as obvious
  in recent times, and in one sense of the term "experience" no doubt it is
  so. But not, I shall argue, in the sense that makes their experiences an
  appropriate object of moral concern.
• I shall assume that no one would seriously maintain
  that dogs, cats, sheep, cattle, pigs, or chickens consciously think things
  to themselves (let alone that fish or reptiles do).
• Second,
  are nonconscious pains an appropriate object of sympathy and moral
  concern? If not, then the sufferings of brutes will make no moral claims
  upon us.
• Similarly then in the case of brutes: since their experiences, including their
  pains, are nonconscious ones, their pains are of no immediate moral
  concern. Indeed, since all the mental states of brutes are nonconscious, their
  injuries are lacking even in indirect moral concern. Since the disappointments
  caused to a dog through possession of a broken leg are themselves nonconscious in their turn, they, too, are not appropriate objects of our
  sympathy. Hence, neither the pain of the broken leg itself, nor its further
  effects upon the life of the dog, have any rational claim upon our sympathy.
• Much time and money is presently spent on alleviating the pains
  of brutes which ought properly to be directed toward human beings, and
  many are now campaigning to reduce the efficiency of modern farming
  methods because of the pain caused to the animals involved. If the arguments
  presented here have been sound, such activities are not only morally
  unsupportable but morally objectionable.
• Similarly then in the case of brutes: since their pains are
  nonconscious (as are all their mental states), they ought not to be allowed
  to get in the way of any morally-serious objective.
• There is no such rationale in the case of brutes. For our sympathy and
  concern for their pains and injuries cannot be said to have an effect on the
  persons they will one day become.